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The Arizona Court of Appeals recently developed a new test to determine
whether an anonymous Internet poster’s identity should be revealed through
a subpoena. While the First Amendment protects anonymous speech, this
protection does not extend to defamation and other illegal behavior. Courts
have balanced these two competing interests—protection of anonymous
speech and revelation of a person’s identity via subpoena—by applying
varying tests regarding the disclosure of an anonymous poster’s identity. The
Arizona Court of Appeals, in Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, recently adopted a three-
part test that incorporates elements from two, previously distinct lines of
cases. This Article explores the varying standards that apply to the disclosure
of the identity of an anonymous online poster, and compares them to the test
articulated in Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe. This Article concludes that Mobilisa’s
balancing component is an important and novel prong in light of competing
policy and constitutional considerations.
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INTRODUCTION
<1>The Internet provides numerous forums for anonymous speech, including
blogs, chat rooms and email. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized
the contributions anonymous speakers have to public discourse, and commented
that “[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.”2  The increase in
anonymous speech on the Internet has, however, created a difficult paradigm for
courts determining when an anonymous speaker’s identity should be protected, or
his or her identity should be disclosed via a subpoena. As one court explained,
“the constitutional rights of Internet users, including the First Amendment right to
speak anonymously, must be carefully safeguarded.”3  While the First
Amendment protects anonymous speech, this protection does not extend to
defamation and other illegal behavior. When deciding whether a person’s identity
should be revealed through a subpoena, courts must, therefore, balance First 1
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Amendment protections with a plaintiff’s right to remedy wrongful behavior on
the Internet.
<2>This Article focuses on three tests that courts have applied to try to maintain
the balance between the First Amendment’s protection of anonymous speech, and
a plaintiff’s right to protect herself from illegal speech, particularly with respect to
the disclosure of an online anonymous speaker’s identity. The Article analyzes two
previous tests regarding this issue—the Dendrite v. Doe test4  and the Doe v.
Cahill test5 —and gives special attention to the more recent three-part test found
in Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe.6  In Mobilisa, an Arizona Court of Appeals adopted a
three-part test that incorporates two parts from the Cahill case, and adds a third
element found in Dendrite. This Article explores whether the test adopted in
Mobilisa strikes a better balance than previous tests between protecting an
anonymous poster’s First Amendment rights, and ensuring that a plaintiff has
remedies for illegal online behavior. The Article concludes that while the impact of
Mobilisa remains to be seen, the novel balancing component is a positive new
approach in light of competing interests in this area of law.
THE HISTORY OF PROTECTED ANONYMOUS SPEECH
<3>As the Supreme Court has observed on numerous occasions, the First
Amendment safeguards the right of anonymous speech. In McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission, the Supreme Court stated “an author's decision to remain
anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content
of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment.”7  In an earlier case, the Supreme Court emphasized the need for
anonymous speech so that persecuted groups of people can criticize oppressive
practices, particularly where the alternative may be not speaking at all.8  Indeed,
when considering this purpose of protecting anonymous speech it follows that
many Supreme Court decisions addressing the issue of anonymous speech, also
concern political speech.9  The Supreme Court in McIntyre explained that
protecting anonymous political speech receives the highest protection;10
however, this priority takes on new dimensions in the digital age.
Anonymous Online Speech
<4>The expansion of the Internet has increased the number of forums available
for anonymous speech, as well as increased the quantity of litigation surrounding
these modes of digital expression. According to Technorati—a search engine that
monitors over a hundred million blogs—there are more than one million blog
posts per day.11  Courts have, in light of this vast new arena, recognized the
connection between earlier versions of anonymous speech and the Internet. In a
previous decision, the Supreme Court explained that First Amendment protection
should be granted to the Internet.12  As another court put it, “the Internet is a
truly democratic forum . . . [and] [f]or this reason, the constitutional rights of
Internet users, including the First Amendment right to speak anonymously, must
be carefully safeguarded.”13  Thus, while not all Internet posts are anonymous,
the ability to participate in anonymous free speech online has forced courts to
more closely examine if and when online postings should be considered protected
free speech.
<5>Additional decisions reiterate the First Amendment’s application to online
anonymous speech, and address the question of when a court order should be
issued, compelling disclosure of the name and identity of an anonymous
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speaker.  In determining whether disclosure is proper, courts have echoed the
concerns involving an anonymous speaker’s First Amendment rights in non-
Internet media. In general, critics fear that plaintiffs will use the court system to
hinder political conversations by forcing people to choose between speaking
anonymously, and not speaking for fear of retaliation.15
<6>However, anonymous online speech is not without limits. As a current case
demonstrates, one in which the defendant stated on a law-school discussion
board that two women should be raped, an anonymous poster’s comments may
extend beyond free speech protections.16  In the case, a Connecticut federal court
must apply a standard to decide whether the poster’s identity should be revealed.
Significantly, however, there are several tests that the court could apply when
considering this issue, some of which will be discussed here.
EARLIER JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR REVEALING AN ANONYMOUS ONLINE POSTER’S
IDENTITY: THE FOUR-PART DENDRITE ANALYSIS
<7>The New Jersey court in Dendrite v. Doe examined the standards courts
should apply to evaluate discovery subpoena applications for the identities of
anonymous posters.17  Dendrite International, Inc. (Dendrite) filed a complaint
against numerous John Does, and specifically John Doe No. 3, for defamation and
misappropriation of trade secrets.18  John Doe No. 3 had made various postings
on the Yahoo! Dendrite bulletin board that described Dendrite’s revenue
recognition policy, and stated that the company’s president was shopping the
company to other corporations.19  Dendrite contended that these postings were
false and constituted defamation. During the process of the litigation, Dendrite
filed a motion to compel discovery to identify John Doe No. 3,20  which the trial
court denied and the appellate court subsequently affirmed.
<8>In affirming the trial court’s decision, the appellate court set forth a four-part
test for trial courts to follow where plaintiffs seek an expedited discovery order
compelling Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to disclose the identity of an
anonymous online poster.21  First, the trial court should require the plaintiff to
make efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subjects of a
subpoena or requested order of disclosure, and also permit the defendants a
reasonable opportunity to oppose the application.22  Second, the court should
request that the plaintiff identify the exact statements allegedly made by
anonymous posters, which the plaintiff considers the actionable speech. Third,
the court must examine whether the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie cause of action against the anonymous defendants.23
Finally, the court must balance the defendant’s First Amendment right of
anonymous free speech with the strength of the case presented, in addition to
considering the necessity for disclosing the anonymous defendant’s identity.24
<9>For example, when making its determination, the Dendrite Court concluded
that the anonymous poster’s identity should not be disclosed where Dendrite
failed to sufficiently demonstrate that John Doe No. 3’s postings caused any
damages to Dendrite’s stock value. As such, the motion to compel the
anonymous poster’s identity was denied.25  Additional court decisions have looked
to the test set forth in Dendrite when faced with similar plaintiff requests for
disclosure, but Dendrite does not provide the only approach to this challenge that
courts must face.26
The Cahill Test: The Summary Judgment Standard
3
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<10>In Doe v. Cahill, the Delaware Sate Supreme Court also faced the issue of
whether to disclose an anonymous poster’s identity. The decision by the state
supreme court was the first of its kind by a state supreme court.27  The Internet
postings at issue in Cahill were two postings by John Doe No. 1 (Doe), which
were made on a blog dedicated to opinions about public issues in the
Smyrna/Clayton area of Delaware.28  Doe asserted that Cahill, a local councilman,
had “obvious mental deterioration” and wrote that “Gahill [sic] is as paranoid as
everyone in town thinks he is.”29  Cahill obtained a court order requiring the ISP
to disclose Doe’s identity.30
<11>In Cahill, the Delaware Supreme Court31  reversed the trial judge’s order that
required the third party—the Internet Service Provider—to disclose Doe’s
identity.32  While the trial judge applied a good faith standard,33  the Delaware
Supreme Court found that this standard failed to adequately protect John Doe’s
First Amendment right to anonymous speech.34  Instead the court adopted the
summary judgment standard.35  In doing so, the court stated that “[w]e conclude
that the summary judgment standard is the appropriate test by which to strike
the balance between a defamation plaintiff’s right to protect his reputation and a
defendant’s right to exercise free speech anonymously.”36
<12>The summary judgment standard applied in Cahill has only two prongs, and
was influenced by the Dendrite Court’s decision.37  The first prong in the Cahill
analysis was the notification provision: a plaintiff must undertake to notify the
anonymous defendants that they are the subject of a subpoena or application for
order of disclosure.38  As mentioned in Dendrite, the plaintiff must withhold action
to allow the defendant an opportunity to file and serve motions opposing the
discovery request.39  The second prong required in Cahill was that the plaintiff
must satisfy the summary judgment standard.40  The court explained this second
prong was, in fact, the third prong in Dendrite, which subsumed the other two
significant requirements present in the Dendrite case. More specifically, the
plaintiff must set forth the exact defamatory statements and the trial court must
balance the defendant’s rights against the strength of the plaintiff’s case.41  The
Cahill Court clarified that a plaintiff need only prove the elements of the claim
that are within the plaintiff’s control.42
<13>In applying the summary judgment standard to the facts of Cahill, the
Delaware Supreme Court concluded that Cahill had failed to plead essential
elements of the claim.43  The court determined that since the statements were
made on a blog specifically dedicated to opinions regarding Smyrna, a reasonable
person would interpret Doe’s statements as mere opinions about Cahill that
lacked any factual basis.44  As such, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the
trial court and remanded with instructions for the case to be dismissed.45  The
Arizona Court of Appeals, in Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 46  subsequently adopted the
Cahill test, in addition to the considerations presented in Dendrite, to create a
new standard when faced with an anonymous poster’s rights.
THE MOBILISA TEST
<14>The dispute in Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe centered on an email from an
anonymous email account. A Mobilisa47  employee used his work account to send
an intimate message to a woman with whom he was engaged in a personal
relationship.48  Six days after the employee sent the contentious email, Mobilisa
managers received a forwarded copy of the text of the email with the subject
4
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line: “Is this a company you want to work for?”49  The email originated from an
anonymous email address maintained by an email service provider known as The
Suggestion Box, Inc. (TSB).50  Mobilisa then filed suit against John Does 1-10,51
and sought to compel TSB to disclose the identities of John Doe 1. The superior
court found that Mobilisa had made a sufficient showing to meet the Cahill two-
part standard, and, therefore, Mobilisa could conduct discovery to determine the
defendant John Doe 1’s identity.52  TSB and the anonymous defendant then
appealed the decision.53
<15>In fashioning the new three-part test, the Arizona Court of Appeals
considered both of the tests established in Dendrite and Cahill, as well as tests
from other decisions. The court of appeals first declined to apply a different test
to property-based claims and claims for defamation.54  The Mobilisa Court stated,
“[w]hether the claim is one for defamation or a property-based claim, the
potential for chilling anonymous speech remains the same.”55  The court also
adopted the combined standard “that the requesting party show the anonymous
speaker has been given adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond
to the discovery request.”56  Furthermore, the court followed the second step of
the Cahill decision—that the requesting party must demonstrate that it would
survive a motion for summary judgment on the elements, not dependent on
knowing the speaker’s identity.57  Finally, the court of appeals in Mobilisa then
departed from Cahill, and instead adopted a Dendrite component that balances
the strength of the requesting party’s case against the need for disclosure of the
anonymous poster’s identity.58
<16>For the final balancing element, a court, as with earlier approaches, must
then decide if the competing interests favor disclosure.59  The Mobilisa Court of
Appeals, in making its determination, focused on three central concerns.
Primarily, the court focused on the fact that the summary judgment element
found in Cahill did not necessarily account for factors weighing against disclosure
of an anonymous poster.60  Adding specific sub-elements to this test allows the
court to consider other additional factors, including the following: (1) the type of
speech involved; (2) the speaker’s privacy expectations; (3) the potential
consequence of a discovery order to the speaker; (4) the need for the speaker’s
identity to advance the requesting party’s position; and (5) the availability of
alternative discovery methods.61
<17>In addition, balancing competing interests is consistent with the standard
used for evaluating a preliminary injunction, which the court found to be
analogous.62  Indeed, balancing the interests “provides an additional safeguard
that comports with Arizona’s broad protection given to free speech and individual
privacy.”63  In light of this new three-part test—the notice requirement, the
summary judgment standard, and the balancing element—the court remanded for
an analysis of the third step.64  Regardless of the case’s final determination, the
Mobilisa test indicates a new hybrid approach that courts may use to assess the
rights of anonymous posters with those of combating questionable online
activities. However, the worth of this new balancing approach has yet to be
determined.
DOES THE MOBILISA TEST PROVIDE A BETTER STANDARD?
<18>The balancing requirement of the Mobilisa test likely improves on the earlier
analysis set forth in Cahill. The Mobilisa test provides greater protection to an
anonymous poster’s identity, which is an important consideration in light of
previous Supreme Court precedent and a poster’s First Amendment rights. Under 5
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the Cahill test, for example, as long as the plaintiff meets the summary judgment
threshold, a court would allow the anonymous poster’s identity to be disclosed.
Meanwhile, as the balancing factor is present in Dendrite, the distinction between
the Mobilisa test and Dendrite test is less apparent. Regardless, the balancing
requirement established by the Arizona Court of Appeals forces a court to
consider the particular circumstances of a case, and to determine if the situation
requires disclosure or warrants protection of anonymous speech.
<19>As the Mobilisa Court itself observed, “[r]equiring the court to consider and
weigh these [additional] factors . . . would provide the court with the flexibility
needed to ensure a proper balance is reached between the parties’ competing
interests on a case-by-case basis.”65  The Mobilisa three-part test requires the
court to weigh the various factors against disclosure and, if known witnesses had
the same information, the anonymous poster’s identity would be protected even
though the plaintiff satisfied the summary judgment element.66  As such, the
Mobilisa test protects Internet posters’ First Amendment rights to speak
anonymously in situations where the court may weigh which factors favor
protection, and provides a novel and improved approach to this issue in light of
competing interests.
CONCLUSION
<20>Courts have struggled to adopt a uniform test that balances the First
Amendment right of an anonymous defendant to remain anonymous, with the
plaintiff’s desire to disclose the defendant’s identity. The Mobilisa test presents a
three-part test that strikes a balance between competing party interests. By
incorporating the notice and summary judgment requirements from Cahill, and
adding a balancing prong, the Mobilisa court presents a test that requires courts
to consider each party’s interests and, thus, better protects anonymous speech
than the Cahill test. Nevertheless, the law concerning the disclosure of
anonymous Internet speech will likely remain in flux as different courts determine
which judicial standard best balances policy considerations. Therefore, the
applicability of the Mobilisa test outside of Arizona remains to be decided, but the
decision appears to provide an improved approach given competing interests
present in the digital age.
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